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REGULATION BY GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED 
REINSURANCE IN CATASTROPHE MANAGEMENT 
QIHAO HE 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
For over a century, reinsurance has been the preferred vehicle to 
shed primary insurers’ catastrophe risk exposure. 1  The Cologne 
Reinsurance Company was the first professional reinsurance company, 
founded in 1842 following a catastrophic fire in Hamburg the same year.2 
Insurers have an increasing demand for more financial capacity when 
underwriting catastrophic risks. For example, reinsurers paid primary 
insurers 60 percent of the insured losses from the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, 65 percent from Hurricane Katrina, and 40 percent from Hurricane 
Sandy more recently.3 
With respect to catastrophic risks, reinsurance’s role takes several 
forms. Reinsurance can take a significant portion of the insured losses from 
primary insurers, diversify catastrophe risks globally, supply underwriting 
assistance, and regulate insurers’ behavior to promote risk mitigation.4 
                                                                                                                 
*Associate Professor of Law, China University of Political Science and Law 
(CUPL), Beijing, China. Visiting Scholar, Boston College Law School & 
University of Pennsylvania Law School; S.J.D., LL.M (Honors) in Insurance Law, 
University of Connecticut School of Law. 
1 Rajna Gibson, Michel A. Habib, & Alexandre Ziegler, Financial Markets, 
Reinsurance, and the Bearing of Natural Catastrophe Risk, SWISS FIN. INST., U. 
ZURICH 1, 2 (2007), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228810986_ 
Financial_Markets_Reinsurance_and_the_Bearing_of_Natural_Catastrophe_Risk. 
2  An Introduction to Reinsurance, SWISS RE (July 12, 2002), 
http://www.swissre.com/publications/An_introduction_to_reinsurance.htm. 
3 FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE BREADTH AND SCOPE OF THE 
GLOBAL REINSURANCE MARKET AND THE CRITICAL ROLE SUCH MARKET PLAYS IN 
SUPPORTING INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2014), 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/FIO%20-%
20Reinsurance%20Report.pdf. 
4  See generally Marcos Antonio Mendoza, Reinsurance as Governance: 
Governmental Risk Management Pools as a Case Study in the Governance Role 
Played by Reinsurance Institutions, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 53 (2014); Aviva 
Abramovsky, Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator?, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 345, 346, 
373 (2009); Veronique Bruggeman, Michael Faure & Tobias Heldt, Insurance 
Against Catastrophe: Government Stimulation of Insurance Markets for 
Catastrophic Events, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185, 186 (2012); VÉRONIQUE 
BRUGGEMAN, COMPENSATING CATASTROPHE VICTIMS: A COMPARATIVE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS APPROACH 130 (2010); David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 
Reinsurance for Catastrophes and Cataclysms, in THE FINANCING OF 
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These roles often go beyond risk transfer and risk financing and expand to 
risk regulation for primary insurers. The former role has been discussed at 
length in law and economics literature,5 but regulation by reinsurance has 
not been widely discussed and has even qualified as problematic. 
Moreover, private reinsurance has come under scrutiny due to catastrophe 
insurance cycles that may lead to insurance unavailability and excessive 
prices, especially after a major event.6 
Government-sponsored reinsurance, which marries the merits of both 
the government and private reinsurance, has gained increasing attention in 
the law and economics literature, and these programs have increased 
substantially in practice. Many countries use government-sponsored 
reinsurance to address catastrophe risks, including France (Caisse Centrale 
de Réassurance), Australia (Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation), 
Japan (Japan Earthquake Reinsurance Co., Ltd.), Turkey (Turkish 
Catastrophe Insurance Pool), Netherlands (Nederlandse 
Herverzekeringsmaatschappij voor Terrorismeschaden), Thailand (National 
Catastrophe Insurance Fund), United States (Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Program and the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund), Belgium (Caisse 
nationale des Calamités and the Terrorism Reinsurance and Insurance Pool), 
and Denmark (Terrorism Insurance Pool for Non-Life Insurance). 7 Most 
of the reinsurance programs cover natural disasters. Meanwhile, many 
questions about those government-sponsored reinsurance programs have 
been raised. Why does the government adopt reinsurance as an intervention 
tool for catastrophe risks? Why might the government be motivated to 
structure its financial support in this manner rather than in others, such as 
providing direct compensation to victims of catastrophes? How could the 
reinsurance industry help regulate catastrophe insurers? How well have 
government-sponsored reinsurance programs worked? And have 
government-sponsored reinsurance programs resulted in any unintended 
                                                                                                                 
CATASTROPHE RISK 254 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999); FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEP’T 
OF TREASURY, supra note 3, at 1. 
5 Many articles are discussing reinsurance as risk transfer and compensation 
to catastrophes victims. See Véronique Bruggeman, Michael G. Faure & Karine 
Fiore, The Government as Reinsurer of Catastrophe Risks?, 35 THE GENEVA 
PAPERS ON RISK AND INS.-ISSUES AND PRACTICE 369, 378 (2010); David Durbin, 
Managing Natural Catastrophe Risks: The Structure and Dynamics of Reinsurance, 
26 THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INS.-ISSUES AND PRACTICE 297 (2001); 
Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 237; J. David Cummins, Reinsurance for 
Natural and Man-Made Catastrophes in the United States: Current State of the 
Market and Regulatory Reforms, 10 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 179, 193 (2007). 
6 Durbin, supra note 5, at 297-300. 
7 Bruggeman, et al., supra note 4. 
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consequences?  
To discuss all these questions is not possible within the scope of 
this Article. This Article will mainly argue why the Chinese government 
should adopt government-sponsored reinsurance and how to expand 
regulation by reinsurance to achieve optimal catastrophe risk management. 
The Article begins by introducing basic principles of reinsurance. Next, the 
Article explores the main regulatory techniques of reinsurance which offer 
primary insurers incentives to underwrite appropriately and mitigate risk. 
Then, the Article discusses reasons why the private reinsurance market 
cannot provide adequate coverage for catastrophe risks and the arguments 
for government-sponsored reinsurance. Next, the Article examines and 
compares several typical government-sponsored reinsurance programs, 
including programs in France (Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (CCR)), 
Japan (Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance Scheme (JERS)), and Turkey 
(Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP)), in which primary insurers 
are regulated by reinsurance. Finally, the Article argues that China should 
adopt government-sponsored reinsurance to address catastrophe risks, and 
the possibility and feasibility of regulation by government-sponsored 
reinsurance in China is addressed. 
 
II. REINSURANCE BASICS 
 
A. INTRODUCTION OF REINSURANCE 
 
Reinsurance can be understood simply as insurers’ insurance. 
Under an insurance contract, a policyholder is protected from loss by 
transferring risk to an insurer; analogously, under a reinsurance contract, an 
insurer (the cedent or ceding company) is protected from exposure by 
transferring risk to a reinsurer.8 From the demand perspective, there are 
many theoretical explanations for a primary insurer’s decision to purchase 
reinsurance. For example, Hoerger, Sloan, and Hassan consider that the 
motive for reinsuring is to avoid bankruptcy, even for an insurer that is not 
averse to risk (a risk-neutral insurer).9 According to other explanations, 
insurers demand reinsurance if they face catastrophic losses, insufficient 
                                                                                                                 
8 FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 3, at 1. 
9 They use their model to assess how the insurer’s surplus, size, and volatility 
of losses affect the amount of reinsurance the primary insurer purchases. See 
generally Thomas J. Hoerger, Frank A. Sloan & Mahmud Hassan, Loss Volatility, 
Bankruptcy, and Insurer Demand for Reinsurance, 3 J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 
221, 221-222, 225 (1990). 
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underwriting capacity, higher loss volatility, lower surplus-to-premium 
ratios, or in the course of retiring from a territory or class of business.10  
From the supply perspective, reinsurance is available from many 
sources, both domestic and abroad. The providers generally include 
professional reinsurers, pools and syndicates, direct insurers, and 
government agencies, which are not mutually exclusive.11 For example, 
many direct insurers are legally empowered to sell reinsurance, and they 
still purchase extra reinsurance from foreign professional reinsurers. 
There are two broad categories of reinsurance agreements: treaty 
reinsurance and facultative reinsurance. Treaty reinsurance covers broad 
groups of policies and binds the cedent to cede a specific portion of the risk 
of an entire class of business, such as all property coverage written by the 
cedents, to a reinsurer through one contract. 12  Compared to treaty 
reinsurance, facultative reinsurance is often used to cover specific and 
catastrophic risks13 because facultative reinsurance allows reinsurers to 
engage in significant underwriting prior to placing the policy and enables 
primary insurers to spread the risks of catastrophic losses that would 
otherwise be beyond their underwriting capacity.14  
 
B. REINSURANCE FOR CATASTROPHE INSURERS 
 
In the property-casualty market, the role of reinsurance is more 
apparent following catastrophes than after other perils. Catastrophes have a 
low probability of occurrence but cause very significant human and 
financial losses. Insurers are reluctant to underwrite catastrophes and even 
exclude these risks from coverage. The general theoretical explanation for 
why primary insurers do not cover catastrophe losses is that losses from 
these events are too large and too highly correlated for insurers to bear 
                                                                                                                 
10 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 739 (2005); Patrick Brockett, Robert C. Witt & Paul R. Aird, An 
Overview of Reinsurance and the Reinsurance Markets, 9 J. OF INS. REG. 432 
(1991); BERNARD L. WEBB, CONNOR M. HARRISON & JAMES J. MARKHAM, 
INSURANCE OPERATIONS 2 (1997). 
11 Bernard L. Webb, Reinsurance as a Social Tool, in 1 ISSUES IN INS. 403, 
413-414 (Everett D. Randall ed., 1987). 
12 BARRY R. OSTRAGER & MARY KAY VYSKOCIL, MODERN REINSURANCE 
LAW AND PRACTICE 2-4 to 2-7 (2d ed. 2000). 
13 ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 1016-1018 (4th ed. 
2007); GRAYDON S. STARING, THE LAW OF REINSURANCE 14-16 (2015). 
14  BARRY OSTRAGER & THOMAS NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE 
COVERAGE DISPUTES 991 (12th ed. 2004). 
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them.15 For primary insurers, losses from catastrophes do not satisfy the 
conditions of statistical independence and hence are not locally insurable.16 
Reinsurance plays a major role in making catastrophes insurable and serves 
an important function as protection against the accumulation of losses from 
catastrophes.17 For reinsurers, because of their ability to diversify globally, 
catastrophe risks can be characterized as globally insurable.18 For example, 
the risk of hurricanes in the United States is independent of the risk of 
earthquake in China. This provides the economic motivation for reinsurers 
to aggregate catastrophe risks over geographic regions and different 
catastrophe lines.19 By diversifying losses across the world, catastrophes 
may not impose unbearable losses on the reinsurer when compared to its 
overall book of business, making it possible for reinsurers to provide 
coverage and pay losses.20 
While primary insurance tends to be a local business, reinsurance is 
more of an international business, especially for catastrophic risks.21 For 
example, in 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused around $90 billion in insured 
property losses in the United States, of which non-US reinsurers paid 
approximately $59 billion.22 Because US primary insurers can access the 
global reinsurance market, they are able to provide coverage and pay 
                                                                                                                 
15 “When losses are highly correlated, insurers’ claims experience is expected 
to be lumpy – the presence of one claim implies a likelihood of many claims. 
Several years may result in no claims, but some years will have gigantic levels of 
claims, and the strain of being prepared for a disaster year means insurers must 
either charge high premiums, or face the risk of bankruptcy. The conventional 
wisdom is that insurers choose to exclude these risks from coverage, rather than 
expose themselves to the year-to-year uncertainty endemic to correlated risks.” See 
Peter Molk, Private Versus Public Insurance for Natural Hazards: Individual 
Behavior's Role in Loss Mitigation, in RISK ANALYSIS OF NATURAL HAZARDS 
(Paolo Gardoni et al. eds., Springer, 2015); see also Jerry, II, supra note 13; 
ABRAHAM, supra note 10. 
16 Cummins, supra note 5, at 181-182. 
17 FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 3, at 1. 
18 Dwight Jaffee, Catastrophe Insurance, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW, 166-167 (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman 
eds., 2015). 
19 Id. 
20 Cummins, supra note 5, at 182. 
21 Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 237. 
22GLOBAL REINSURANCE FORUM, GLOBAL REINSURANCE: STRENGTHENING 
DISASTER RISK RESILIENCE, 8, 11 (2014), https://www.hannover-re.com/306809/ 
global-reinsurance-forum-grf-report-2014.pdf. 
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claims.23 The United States is not an isolated example; reinsurers have 
assumed a large portion of insured natural catastrophe losses in the world. 
For example, in 2011, global insured catastrophe losses reached $110 
billion, and reinsurers assumed more than half (Figure 3). The largest 
reinsurers are in Europe and the Caribbean and are not confined to 
domestic reinsurers.24  
In addition, reinsurers have developed new products such as 
catastrophe bonds, catastrophe derivatives, contingent capital, sidecars, and 
other hybrid products to facilitate new capital flows from the capital market 
into the reinsurance market.25 As a result, capital in the reinsurance market 
has generally been increasing year-over-year for most of the past decade 
(Figure 2).26 For example, as of mid-2014, global reinsurance capital 
amounted to $570 billion ($511 billion is classified as traditional capital 
and $59 billion as alternative capital).27 This accessible outside capital 
enables reinsurers to assume more insured catastrophe losses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
23 Cummins, supra note 5, at 184. 
24 Europe is the origin of reinsurance business, and in Europe, the insurance 
tax laws do allow tax-deductible reserves against future losses. In the Caribbean, a 
number of countries have created special tax havens. See Jaffee, supra note 18, at 
167. 
25 Catastrophe bonds are risked-linked securities that transfer catastrophe risks 
from insurers to investors through fully-collateralized special purpose vehicles 
(SPV). Catastrophe derivatives are financial contracts used to spread catastrophe 
risk to capital market investors that derive value from the value of financial 
instruments, events or conditions; for example, the event can be a wind storm 
making landfall within a certain distance of a given location. A contingent capital 
arrangement is a type of financing that is arranged before a loss occurs. Sidecars 
are special purpose vehicles formed by insurance and reinsurance companies to 
provide additional capacity to write reinsurance, usually for property catastrophes 
and marine risks. See Partner Re, A Balanced Discussion on Insurance 
Linked-Securities (2008), www.partnerre.com; Cummins, supra note 5, at 195.  
26 Cummins, supra note 5, at 193-194. 
27  AON BENFIELD, THE AON BENFIELD AGGREGATE 3 (2014), 
http://thoughtleadership.aonbenfield.com/Documents/201409_aba_1h_2014.pdf.  
2017  CATASTROPHE MANAGEMENT 297 
 
 
Figure 1. Catastrophe risk transfer in the international reinsurance 
market, 201128 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
28 Sebastian Von Dahlen & Goetz Von Peter, Natural Catastrophes and 
Global Reinsurance–Exploring the Linkages, 2012 BIS Q. REV. 23, 27 (Dec. 10, 
2012), http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1212e.pdf.  
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Figure 2. Global reinsurer capital, 2006–201429 
 
III. REGULATORY ACTIVITIES OF REINSURANCE 
 
In many respects, reinsurance often goes beyond pure risk transfer 
and expands to help solve catastrophic risk management issues through 
serving as an enforcer of compliance with government regulations and 
reinsurance contracts.30 A major difficulty with catastrophe reinsurance is 
moral hazard, a problem also encountered by primary insurance vis-à-vis 
policyholders. It is logical for primary insurers to change their behavior as 
soon as the risk is fully ceded to the reinsurer. As a private regulator, 
reinsurance provides incentives for the primary insurers to engage in 
mitigation and prevention of catastrophe losses, and thus reduce moral 
hazard. Reinsurance has a direct and significant impact on the business 
operation of primary insurance and even an indirect impact on the insureds, 
from contract design such as pricing, through underwriting and issuing of a 
                                                                                                                 
29 AON BENFIELD, THE AON BENFIELD AGGREGATE: RESULTS FOR THE SIX 
MONTHS ENDED JUNE 30, 2014, 3 (2014), http://thoughtleadership.aonbenfield.com/ 
Documents/201409_aba_1h_2014.pdf. 
30 Guido Funke, The Munich Re View on Climate-Change Litigation, in 
LIABILITY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE? EXPERTS’ VIEWS ON A POTENTIAL EMERGING 
RISK 22, 23 (Munich Re 2010); Lawrence Samplatsky, The Role of Reinsurance in 
Life Insurance Industry 23 (2003) (unpublished LLM master thesis, University of 
Connecticut) (on file with author). 
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policy, and ending with agreeing or refusing to pay for a claim.31 This part 
introduces four main tools that almost all reinsurers use to one degree or 
another to control moral hazard: loss-sensitive premiums, the duty of 
utmost good faith, providing risk management service, and indirect 
regulation of insureds. To be clear, I do not contend that these activities will 
exclusively solve moral hazard, nor do I contend that moral hazard 
management provides an adequate description for addressing catastrophe 
risk. However, by supplying both the incentive and the know-how that 
primary insurers often lack, reinsurance can realize value enhancing.  
 
A. LOSS-SENSITIVE PREMIUMS 
 
Catastrophes usually cause numerous claims at the same time. 
Insurers tend to pass on correlated losses to their reinsurers and thus the 
moral hazard problem becomes severe.32 Traditionally, reinsurers could 
control moral hazard by monitoring primary insurers’ business operations, 
including their underwriting activities and claims settlements. More 
importantly, reinsurers could use loss-sensitive premiums to control moral 
hazard. Loss-sensitive premiums generally refer to the situation where “the 
price of reinsurance is sensitive to concurrent reinsurance losses and to the 
prior period’s losses total and reinsured losses.”33 Loss-sensitive premiums 
require that reinsurance premiums should reflect an actuarially fair cost and 
integrate into general techniques like deductibles, co-payments, and “ex 
post settling up.”34 Neil Doherty and Kent Smetters have proved that 
reinsurers can control moral hazard effectively by using loss-sensitive 
premiums when the insurers and reinsurers are not affiliates (i.e., not part 
of the same financial group).35 They present a multiperiod principal-agent 
model of the reinsurance transaction and test it empirically. They find 
strong evidence for the use of loss-sensitive premiums when the insurer and 
reinsurer are not affiliates, and their results show that price controls can 
limit moral hazard. 36  Since insurers and reinsurers are generally not 
                                                                                                                 
31 Mendoza, supra note 4; Abramovsky, supra note 4; Samplatsky, supra note 
30, at 23. 
32 Neil Doherty & Kent Smetters, Moral Hazard in Reinsurance Markets, 72 J. 
OF RISK AND INS. 375 (2005). 
33 Id. at 382. 
34 Id. at 375-376; Loss-sensitive premium is also called the actuarially fair 
premium, or risk-based pricing. See Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 260. 
35 Doherty & Smetters, supra note 32. 
36 Id. 
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affiliates in underwriting catastrophe risks,37 using loss-sensitive premiums 
is an effective regulatory tool for reinsurers to control moral hazard. 
Is using loss-sensitive premiums feasible in practice? The answer 
could be yes, thanks to risk-sharing mechanisms developed by reinsurance 
and less rate regulation in reinsurance transactions. First, several effective 
risk-sharing mechanisms are often introduced for catastrophe reinsurance 
premium design. The first one is retrospective rating, which adjusts 
premiums based on losses incurred during the policy period.38 The second 
one is experience rating, which adjusts premiums based on losses in 
previous periods and which is useful when retrospective rating is not 
available.39 Furthermore, although catastrophe perils are relatively rare, 
when series data on losses and claims is missing, the alternative method is 
using exposure-based modeling, which relies on scientific information and 
expert opinion; claims experience is only used to check and calibrate the 
model.40 Second, compared to primary insurance, reinsurance markets are 
lightly regulated except in a few countries such as the United Kingdom, 
where reinsurers are regulated in the same way as direct insurers.41  
 
B. THE DUTY OF UTMOST GOOD FAITH 
 
Primary insurers’ duty of utmost good faith is the core principle of 
the reinsurance relationship.42 Utmost good faith is an expressive phrase 
borrowed from Roman law, uberrima fides, which is defined as the “most 
abundant good faith; absolute and perfect candor or openness and honesty; 
the absence of any concealment or deception, however slight.”43 The 
reinsurance premium is less than the primary insurance premium; 
otherwise, primary insurers would have no incentives to underwrite such 
risk. Thus reinsurers cannot duplicate the costly but necessary efforts of the 
primary insurer in evaluating risks and handling claims. Through obligating 
                                                                                                                 
37 See id. at 378 (“Insurance of natural catastrophes is often undertaken by 
regional or national primary insurers and reinsured by national or international 
reinsurance firms.”). 
38 Id. at 375-376. 
39 Id. at 382-384. 
40  SWISS RE, UNDERSTANDING REINSURANCE: HOW REINSURERS CREATE 
VALUE AND MANAGE RISK 12 (2005), http://www.grahambishop.com/ 
DocumentStore/SwissRe%20Understanding%20reinsurance.pdf.  
41 Cummins, supra note 5, at 201. 
42 See BARRY R. OSTRAGER & MARY KAY VYSKOCIL, MODERN REINSURANCE 
LAW AND PRACTICE 91 (2014). 
43 Utmost Good Faith, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
2017  CATASTROPHE MANAGEMENT 301 
 
primary insurers to act in good faith, reinsurers can control moral hazard 
through “invisible” monitoring without high cost.44  
The duty of utmost good faith requires the primary insurer to 
disclose all material facts which may affect the subject risk.45 Those 
material facts may include the reinsured’s underwriting process; the 
reinsured’s amendment, renewal, or commutation in the placing of 
reinsurance; the payment of claims; and whether risks have been ceded 
fraudulently contrary to a treaty or representations.46 As one court has 
stated, “[I]nsurance authorities are agreed that a ceding company, which is 
in possession of all the details relating to the risk, is required to exercise the 
utmost good faith in all its dealings with the reinsurer.”47 This places the 
reinsurer in the same position as the reinsured “to give him the same means 
and opportunity of judging…the value of risks.”48 To be notable, utmost 
good faith requires the insurer to provide timely notice of claim in some 
courts,49 because it permits the reinsurer “to reserve properly, to adjust 
premiums to reflect the loss experience under the reinsurance contract, and 
to decide whether to exercise the option of becoming associated with the 
ceding insurer in the handling and disposition of the claim.”50 
As the core principle of the reinsurance relationship, the utmost 
good faith is enforced by many mechanisms. The first mechanism is the 
specific reinsurance contract provisions. It is a kind of private legislation 
since the parties to the reinsurance contract are sufficiently sophisticated. 
For example, reinsurers often include the “audit and inspection clauses” in 
the reinsurance contract which require “the reinsured’s records relative to 
the contract sessions to be always open to the reinsurer at reasonable 
times.”51 Such clauses guarantee and protect reinsurers’ access to their 
reinsured’s underwriting and claims handling practices. The second 
                                                                                                                 
44 In the reference to utmost good faith as the “invisible” monitoring force, 
the concept is borrowed from the metaphor of “the invisible hand” used by Adam 
Smith in economics.  
45 STEVEN PLITT, ET AL., 1A COUCH ON INSURANCE § 9:17, at 82-83 (3d ed. 
2010). 
46 STARING, supra note 13, at 151-152. 
47 Nw. Mut. Fire Ass'n v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Providence, 144 F.2d 
274, 276 (9th Cir. 1944) (requiring disclosure of all material facts). 
48 Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ocean Ins. Co., 107 U.S. 485, 510 (1883). 
49 See e.g., Fortress Re, Inc. v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 333 (E.D.N.C. 
1978), aff'd, 628 F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1980); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 773 F.2d 
15 (1st Cir. 1985). 
50 BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE 
COVERAGE DISPUTES, § 16.02, at 563 (5th ed. 1992). 
51 STARING, supra note 13, § 15:8, at 333-334. 
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mechanism is court enforcement. The court often recognizes that primary 
insurers’ failure to act in utmost good faith offers the reinsurer a defense to 
its reinsurance obligation. 52  More importantly, the court requires of 
primary insurers such behavior as a condition precedent to reinsurers’ 
performance of indemnity obligation.53 In the case of catastrophes in 
which reinsurance is triggered by extremely large dollar-value claims, 
primary insurers will undoubtedly take the enforcement of utmost good 
faith into serious consideration. A third mechanism by which reinsurance 
promotes efficiency is longer-term relationship controls. Reinsurance is 
generally not a one-off deal but conducted as a long-term relationship. 
Long-term relationships bond both parties, and the reinsurer can increase 
the effectiveness of its monitoring because the reinsurer can use past 
experience to set future prices and terms, or even to refuse to underwrite.54 
 
C. PROVIDING RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICE 
 
Reinsurers can act not only as capital suppliers but also as risk 
management service providers. For relatively simple products, reinsurers 
may simply act as capital suppliers. As for complex products, such as 
underwriting catastrophic risks, reinsurers may take a more active role, 
more analogous to product-design consultants, through facultative 
reinsurance.55 Since reinsurers deal with different catastrophe lines among 
geographic regions in the world, they are in a better position to share their 
experiences with the ceding companies. Providing risk management service 
for the primary insurers can take several forms: (1) Entry into the market. 
Global reinsurers can help potential new market participants remove entry 
barriers, especially for those in developing countries, and allow insurers to 
enter this new market slowly by initially reinsuring a large portion of their 
risks.56 (2) Product design and underwriting assistance. Reinsurers can 
supply expert knowledge to new market participants and provide related 
data to develop a pricing model for a new product.57 For example, from 
1998 to 2002, Swiss Re, cooperating with Beijing Normal University, 
completed the Digital Map of China Catastrophe Events, which includes 
                                                                                                                 
52 See e.g., Liquidation of Union Indemn. Ins. Co. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 
674 N.E.2d 313, 319-320 (N.Y. 1996). 
53 See e.g., Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 1049, 1054 
(2d Cir. 1993). 
54 Abramovsky, supra note 4, at 383-384 n. 144. 
55 Samplatsky, supra note 30, at 26. 
56  Patrick Brockett, Robert C. Witt & Paul R. Aird, An Overview of 
Reinsurance and the Reinsurance Markets, 9 J. INS. REG. 3, 432, 440-444 (1991). 
57 Samplatsky, supra note 30, at 26. 
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historical data on geography, weather, and so on, since the twelfth 
century.58  This digital map has been very helpful for the pricing of 
catastrophe insurance. (3) Claims processing. Reinsurers can review the 
basis of insurers’ decisions, and reinsurance contracts allow the reinsurer to 
opt out of an insurer’s decision to deny coverage. The judgment of a 
reinsurer typically provides guidance to ceding insurers that can prevent 
violations of unfair claims practices acts.59 
 
D. INDIRECT REGULATION OF INSUREDS 
 
Besides primary insurers, reinsurers may even regulate behaviors 
of insureds and control their moral hazard.60 Generally speaking, reinsurers 
have no direct contract relationship with the insureds. Because reinsurers 
and insureds are parties to a secondary indemnity agreement, reinsurers do 
not usually pay the original insureds. 61  However, under the fronting 
agreement arrangement,62  the reinsurer might have the opportunity to 
regulate the insureds, even indirectly. The main purpose of the fronting 
agreement is to allow a reinsurer who is not locally licensed to do 
business.63 One New York court described a fronting agreement as an 
arrangement where an insurer issued a policy on a risk “with an 
                                                                                                                 
58  XI GUO & XINJIANG WEI, The Difficulties and Solutions for Issuing 
Catastrophe Bonds in China, 8 FRONTIERS L. CHINA 521, 550-553 (2013) (2005). 
59 Samplatsky, supra note 30, at 35-39. 
60 The reinsurer has strong incentives to regulate the insureds. Some primary 
insurance policy includes “cut-out” provisions which allow a direct action by the 
insureds against the reinsurer. “Cut-out” provisions allow “an endorsement to an 
insurance policy or reinsurance contract which provides that, in the event of the 
insolvency of the insurance company, the amount of any loss which would have 
been recovered from the reinsurer by the insurance company (or its statutory 
receiver) will be paid instead directly to the policyholder, claimant, or other payee, 
as specified by the endorsement, by the reinsurer.” See REINSURANCE ASS’N OF 
AM., Fundamentals of Property and Casualty Reinsurance, 32 (2016), 
http://www.reinsurance.org/files/public/07FundamentalsandGlossary1.pdf.  
61 DAVID M. RAIM, JOY L. LANGFORD, DANIEL W. GERBER, AARON J. AISEN & 
CHRISTOPHER H. BROWN, NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 
40.01 (2007). 
62 Despite the slightly pejorative terms used in this arrangement, there is 
nothing illegal in a domestic insurer acting as a front for the unauthorized insurer. 
In fact, so long as all other regulatory goals are met, these relationships can allow 
for a significant increase in insurance capacity. See RAIM ET AL., supra note 61, at 
§40.04(5). 
63 Union Sav. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. North Central Life Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. 
481, 484 (S. D. Miss. 1993). 
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understanding that another party will insure it.”64 Therefore, the risks 
underwritten by a primary insurer who has made the fronting agreement 
with a reinsurer will be assumed in the end by the reinsurer.65 In other 
words, the reinsurer will be responsible for the entire amount that it is 
required to pay under the original policy. Generally, the licensed insurer 
will receive a fee for acting as the “front,”66 while the reinsurers can act as 
insurers to regulate insureds through risk-based pricing, contract design, 
claims management, and refusal to insure. 
 
IV. REASONS FOR GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED 
REINSURANCE FOR CATASTROPHES 
 
The previous section explored the main regulatory techniques of 
reinsurance which control primary insurers’ moral hazard and offer them 
incentives to underwrite approprately and mitigate risk. This leads to the 
issue of how government-provided reinsurance works and how it differs 
from regulation by private reinsurance. Before answering these questions, a 
prerequisite discussion should be why the government is involved in 
catastrophe reinsurance and why not leave all catastrophe reinsurance to 
the private market. The main rationale offered to justify governments’ 
sponsoring catastrophe insurers and acting as reinsurers of catastrophe risks 
is the imperfections of private reinsurance. 
Underwriting cycles show the imperfection of private reinsurance. 
The phenomenon of the underwriting cycle, which refers to the tendency of 
insurance markets to go through alternating phases of “hard” and “soft” 
markets, is an important characteristic of insurance markets. 67  Hard 
markets are usually triggered by capital depletions resulting from 
underwriting catastrophic losses of unexpected magnitude. 68  Figure 3 
shows the infamous cyclical nature of property-casualty insurance from the 
                                                                                                                 
64 Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Excess Ins. Co., 970 F. Supp. 265, 267 n.2 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
65 Reliance Ins. Co. v. Shriver, Inc., 224 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(describing a fronting agreement as a “well-established ad perfectly legal scheme” 
where policies are issued by state-licensed insurance companies and then 
immediately reinsured to 100 percent of face value). 
66 Venetsanos v. Zucker, Facher & Zucker, 638 A.2d 1333, 1337 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
67 Hard market leads to decreased supply but increased premium whereas in a 
soft market, coverage supply is plentiful and prices decline. See DAVID CUMMINS 
& OLIVIER MAHUL. CATASTROPHE RISK FINANCING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
PRINCIPLES FOR PUBLIC INTERVENTION, 55 (2009). 
68 Cummins, supra note 5, at 179-220. 
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years following 1989. It clearly indicates that reinsurance prices are 
cyclical.69 The hard market in the 1990s was caused by Hurricane Andrew 
(1992). The magnitude of losses from Andrew took insurers by surprise, 
and thirteen insurance companies even went bankrupt primarily as a result 
of capital depletions. 70  After the catastrophe, insurance companies 
improved loss estimation and risk management capabilities; insurers and 
catastrophe modeling firms revised upward their expectations of future 
hurricane losses.71 Accordingly, prices of reinsurance increased for the 
1993 renewals.  
 
Figure 3. US catastrophe reinsurance: rate on line index72 
 
 
To some extent, reinsurers are facing similar financing limitations 
to those faced by primary insurers.73 During periods of hard markets, there 
                                                                                                                 
69 Reinsurance prices increased and supply contracted following the 1992 
Hurricane Andrew, paralleling the market response to later 2005 hurricane seasons. 
70 A.M. Best Company, 2006 Annual Hurricane Study: Shake, Rattle, and 
Roar (May 2006). 
71 Cummins, supra note 5, at 192.  
72 The rate on line is a pricing concept, which is found by dividing the 
contractual reinsurance premium by the reinsurance limit and converting the result 
into a percentage. See Kenneth Froot, The Intermediation of Financial Risks: 
Evolution in the Catastrophe Reinsurance Market, 11 RISK MGMT. AND INS. REV. 
281, 281-294 (2008); 
73 Many primary insurers do not have enough capital and surplus themselves 
to survive catastrophes, and they have to rely upon the reinsurance market to 
recompense catastrophic damages. See VERONIQUE BRUGGEMAN, COMPENSATING 
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is often insufficient reinsuring capacity. Why are so few assets allocated to 
catastrophe reinsurance? Since the market distortions appear to be more 
supply- (reinsurer) than demand- (primary insurer) related,74 explanations 
for imperfections in the reinsurance market mainly consider supply 
restrictions. The explanations below are well documented in the law and 
economics literature.  
First, informational asymmetries between capital providers and 
reinsurers about exposure levels and reserve adequacy can result in high 
costs of capital during hard markets. 75  It might be more costly for 
reinsurers to raise additional funds since capital providers cannot clearly 
separate performance into event losses and reinsurers’ skill in peril 
selection.76 Irrational investor behavior, such as investor “trend following,” 
may also decrease the supply of capital to reinsurance after a major 
catastrophe.77 The consensus in the economics literature is that shortages 
are driven by capital market and insurance market imperfections that 
prevent capital from flowing freely into and out of the reinsurance 
corporations in response to catastrophic losses.78  
A major catastrophe may deplete reinsurer capital and surplus, and 
require some time to replenish.79 Without additional funds from capital 
providers, such depletion of equity capital is likely to result in raised 
premiums for reinsurance, which are above the expected loss of such 
                                                                                                                 
CATASTROPHE VICTIMS: A COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH 136 
(2010). 
74 According to a set of demand–supply equilibrium points, graphed in terms 
of price and quantity of reinsurance provided, Froot shows a strong negative 
correlation between price and quantity supplied emerges. It suggests that supply 
shocks are the main driver rather than demand—a decline in supply results in an 
increase in price and decline in quantity of risk transfer. See Froot, supra note 72. 
75 CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 67, at 194. 
76 Kenneth Froot, The Market for Catastrophe Risk: A Clinical Examination, 
60 J. OF FIN. ECON. 529, 529–571 (2001). 
77 Investor trend following refers to the situation that investors expect recent 
performance to continue, as a result, they tend to buy exposures that have recently 
performed well and to sell those that have not. Id. 
78 Ralph Winter, The Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 3 J. OF FIN. 
INTERMEDIATION 379–415 (1994); David Cummins & Patricia M. Danzon, Price 
Shocks and Capital Flows in Liability Insurance, J. OF FIN. INTERMEDIATION 6 (1): 
3–38 (1997); David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty, Capitalization of the 
Property-Liability Insurance Industry: Overview, J. OF FIN. SERVICES RES. 21 (1–
2): 5–14 (2002); CUMMINS & MAHUL, supra note 67, at 194. 
79 Froot, supra note 72, at 285. 
2017  CATASTROPHE MANAGEMENT 307 
 
coverage.80 Using empirical evidence from the year following Hurricane 
Andrew for those insurers that had greater exposure to the southeastern 
United States and to hurricanes wherever they occur, Froot demonstrates 
that reinsurance “prices rise most where quantities decline most.”81   
Second, reinsurers may have market power, and supply shortages 
and high prices after catastrophes may occur because reinsurers have no 
incentive to increase their capital. By putting less money at risk and 
preventing new entry, incumbent reinsurers keep prices high.82 The former 
Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner argued that market power among 
reinsurers is the main reason that catastrophe reinsurance has proved more 
profitable than insurance.83 Barriers to entry are also relevant to the market 
power story.84 The absence of entry barriers tends to suggest that there is 
no market power; it is entry barriers that permit sellers to keep prices above 
marginal costs. Froot has provided empirical evidence to support the 
hypothesis that there was considerable entry into the reinsurance market in 
the 1990s.85  
Third, the corporate form of reinsurance ownership may also 
contribute to short supply in the reinsurance market in the wake of 
catastrophes. 86  Corporations create agency costs because managers’ 
(“agents”) interests may not perfectly align with those of shareholders 
(“principals”). Managers act in many ways that do not maximize the 
corporation’s value, but instead advance their personal financial interests.87   
 
                                                                                                                 
80  Frank A. Sloan & Lindsey M. Chepke, Reinsurance, in MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE 247, 252-253 (2008). 
81 Froot, supra note 76. 
82 Froot, supra note 76, at 559. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 560. 
85 Froot notes that the 1990s were not crisis years, but sellers could have been 
poised for entry when and if prices of reinsurance rose. Id. 
86 Froot, supra note 72, at 287. See HOWARD KUNREUTHER, MARK V. PAULY 
& THOMAS RUSSELL, DEMAND AND SUPPLY SIDE ANOMALIES IN CATASTROPHE 
INSURANCE MARKETS: THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS, Paper 
prepared for the MIT/LSE/Cornell Conference on Behavioral Economics 17-18 
(2004) (suggesting that capital suppliers may believe that the high losses they 
experienced are not random which reflects reinsurer mismanagement).  
87 Froot, supra note 76, at 567; Frank A. Sloan & Lindsey M. Chepke, 
Reinsurance, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, 247-276, 253 (2008). 
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V. GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED CATASTROPHE 
REINSURANCE PROGRAMS: EXAMPLES  
 
Section III described the tools available to reinsurers in regulating 
insurers and the underwritten catastrophe risks. We saw that through 
contract design (loss-sensitive premiums), utmost good faith, providing risk 
management service, and indirect regulation of insureds, reinsurance has 
the capacity to perform a social function that is regulatory in nature: less 
moral hazard on the part of primary insurers and better preparedness on the 
part of insureds. Section IV explained why much of the reinsurance for 
catastrophe risks in the world is sponsored by the government. Compared 
with the capital shortfall of private reinsurers, the government can channel 
capital effectively and quickly after catastrophes since it can raise money 
through taxes or borrow money by issuing debt or government bonds.88 
This part examines how government-sponsored reinsurance programs 
work. Government-sponsored reinsurance is increasingly welcomed by law 
and economics scholarship as a way to manage catastrophic risks. 89 
Meanwhile, government-sponsored reinsurance has increased substantially 
in practice, and many programs are often established when 
primary-insurance markets break down. It is not possible within the scope 
of this Article to critically analyze all of the programs that exist, some of 
which were mentioned in the introduction. Accordingly, this discussion 
will be limited to the French CCR, the Japanese JERS and the Turkish 
TCIP. As these examples demonstrate, there is wide variation in the nature 
and extent of regulation through catastrophe reinsurance across different 
countries. 
Government-sponsored reinsurance is a kind of public-private 
partnership that marries the merits of both government and reinsurance.90 
The origins of such partnerships can be traced to the nuclear liability 
conventions which emerged in the 1960s. 91  Government-sponsored 
reinsurance programs have since expanded to many lines of insurance, 
                                                                                                                 
88 Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 258-259.  
89  See e.g., Bruggeman, Faure & Heldt, supra note 4, at 212; Howard 
Kunreuther & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Managing Catastrophic Risks through 
Redesigned Insurance: Challenges and Opportunities, In HANDBOOK OF INS., 517, 
523 (George Dionne ed., 2013); Bruggeman, Faure & Fiore, supra note 5, at 374. 
90 Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules Rather than Discretion: Lessons 
from Hurricane Katrina, 33 J. OF RISK & UNCERTAINTY 101, 1112-113 (2006); 
Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism--and Crime, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 268, 314 (2003). 
91 The Price-Anderson Act, concerning nuclear facilities, is an example of this 
model. See Bruggeman, Faure & Fiore, supra note 89, at 376. 
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including medical malpractice,92 expropriation insurance,93 crop insurance 
programs,94  and terrorism insurance after the September 11 terrorism 
attack.95 Since the government has substantial credit capacity due to its 
ability to raise money through tax or borrow money by issuing debt far 
more readily than private insurers or reinsurers,96 it is widely recognized 
that the government can help address catastrophic risks in some respects, 
and can thus be used to support the failures of the primary insurance 
market.97  
 
A. THE FRENCH CCR  
 
The French government-sponsored reinsurance for natural disasters 
takes the form of subsidized government reinsurance with mandatory 
private primary insurance. 98  In France, private insurers offered little 
                                                                                                                 
92 For example, New Jersey enacted the New Jersey Medical Malpractice 
Reinsurance Association in 1976, and any member of the association could be 
approved by the association to write malpractice coverage. The insurer would then 
be reinsured by the association either in full or in part. See Vincent R. Zarate, N.J. 
Malpractice Unit Activated, J. OF COM. 9 (1977).  
93 For example, in the U.S., expropriation insurance written by the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) was a purely governmental program, and 
eventually OPIC turned the program over to private insurers, with OPIC 
functioning only as a reinsurer. See Bernard Webb, Reinsurance as a Social Tool, 
in ISSUES IN INS. 279, 326 (1984). 
94 For example, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) is authorized 
to provide reinsurance for “all risks” crop written by private insurers. See 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N., 5949. 
95 After 11 September 2001, when airline risks became more difficult to 
insure, the U.S. federal government guaranteed insurance coverage. See Kenneth 
Abraham, United States of America. Liability for Acts of Terrorism under US Law 
in TERRORISM, TORT L. AND INS.: A COMP. SURVEY, 176–188 (B. A. Koch ed. 
2004). 
96 Louis Kaplow, Incentives and Government Relief for Risk, 4 J. OF RISK AND 
UNCERTAINTY 167, 167-175 (1991). 
97  See John V. Jacobi, Government Reinsurance Programs and 
Consumer-Driven Care, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 537 (2005); Daniel A. Schenck, Next 
Step for Brownfields Government Reinsurance of Environmental Cleanup Policies, 
10 CONN. INS. L.J. 401 (2003); Mark A. Hall, Government-Sponsored Reinsurance, 
19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 465 (2010); Bruggeman, Faure & Heldt, supra note 89, at 
39; Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 89, at 517, 546. 
98 Lorilee Medders, Kathleen McCullough & Verena Jäger, Tale of Two 
Regions: Natural Catastrophe Insurance and Regulation in the United States and 
the European Union, 30 J. INS. REG. 171, 184 (2011). 
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coverage for natural catastrophe risks, and the government intervened 
through ad hoc assistance in the aftermath of disasters until 1982.99 The 
1982 disaster law required private insurers to underwrite catastrophic risks 
and permitted them to cede those risks to CCR, the state-guaranteed 
reinsurer.100 To gain the benefit of the government guarantee, CCR pays an 
annual “premium” to the government (Article R. 431-16-2 Insurance 
Code), similar to private retrocession.101 
CCR provides a coverage system which compounds twofold layers 
based on two separate treaties: a 50 percent quota share treaty and a 
stop-loss treaty with an unlimited governmental guarantee.102 Those risks 
not covered by the quota share treaty are subject to the stop-loss treaty. The 
stop-loss treaty with an unlimited governmental guarantee enables primary 
insurers to underwrite high severity hazards. 
Loss-Sensitive Premiums. Loss-sensitive premiums require that 
reinsurance premiums should reflect an actuarially fair cost and reinsured 
losses. CCR offered coverage on identical terms and a rather low price to 
all ceding companies in the first fifteen years as a result of benefits from an 
unlimited guarantee from the French Treasury.103 In 1997, CCR revised its 
reinsurance terms because of the deterioration of the claims figures and 
changes in the primary insurance market. It began to move forward to 
loss-sensitive premiums setting, and its rating of the “stop-loss” covers was 
decided based upon each individual insurer’s loss record.104  
Such loss-sensitive premiums setting represents a good start, but it 
still has a long way to go. With the governmental guarantee, CCR charges 
relatively lower premiums to primary insurers than other private 
reinsurance companies and thus crowds them out of the market.105 On the 
                                                                                                                 
99 David Moss, Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster 
Policy since 1803, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., 307, 345 (Kenneth A. Froot, eds. 
1999).  
100 Decree No. 82-706 of 10 August 1982 on the Reinsurance Operations for 
the Natural Catastrophe Risks by the Caisse Centrale de Re´assurance. 
Application of Article 4 of the Act No. 82-600 of 13 July 1982, JORF 11 August 
1982. See Bruggeman, Faure & Fiore, supra note 5, at 379-380. 
101  Suzanne Vallet, Insuring the Uninsurable: The French Natural 
Catastrophe Insurance System, in Catastrophe Risk and Reinsurance: A Country 
Risk Management Perspective, 199, 206 (Eugene N. Gurenko ed. 2004). 
102 Medders, McCullough & Jäger, supra note 98, at 184. 
103 Vallet, supra note 101, at 211. 
104 Such price setting does not include quota share treaty. Id. at 211-212. 
105  Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Catastrophe Economics: The National Flood 
Insurance Program, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 165, 183-184 (2010) (“The CCR is not a 
monopolistic disaster reinsurer. In fact, there are several reinsurers writing business 
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other hand, it will be the taxpayers who ultimately pay CCR’s unlimited 
coverage that can offset damages. 106  France’s relatively moderate 
exposure to natural disasters makes the operation of CCR suitable to 
France. It is still questionable to what extent CCR is capable of dealing 
with the next mega-catastrophe. 
The Duty of Utmost Good Faith. The duty of utmost good faith is 
enforced by two mechanisms in the operation of CCR. First, the 50 percent 
quota share treaty of CCR contributes to primary insurers’ performance of 
the duty of utmost good faith. Primary insurers have to retain half of the 
risks themselves under the 50 percent quota share treaty, which gives them 
an incentive to underwrite appropriately. 107  Second, the long-term 
relationship between CCR and the ceding companies also contributes to the 
performance of the duty of utmost good faith. As the state-guaranteed 
reinsurer, CCR has operated several decades and has abundant records of 
the ceding companies. Such experiences help CCR effectively monitor 
primary insurers’ performance of utmost good faith. 
Providing Risk Management Service. It is unclear whether CCR 
provides risk management services for the ceding companies. Nonetheless, 
as one of the top twenty reinsurance carriers in the world with an AAA 
rating from Standard & Poor’s, CCR clearly has expertise in risk 
management. 108  Dealing with ceding companies of different sizes, 
differing legal forms, and various types of portfolios, CCR is in a better 
position to share its experiences in managing catastrophe risk and 
providing coverage for multiple types of natural hazards. 
Indirect Regulation of Insureds. Since CCR is licensed to conduct 
business in France, there is no need for a fronting agreement arrangement. 
There is no empirical evidence of its indirect regulation of insureds.  
 
B. THE JAPANESE JERS  
 
The Japanese government-sponsored reinsurance for earthquakes 
takes the form of the government providing reinsurance capacity. JERS 
was established based on the Act on Earthquake Insurance in 1966 enacted 
after the Niigata earthquake in 1964.109 Primary insurers issue standard 
                                                                                                                 
with primary reinsurers in France.”); see Medders, McCullough & Jäger, supra 
note 98, at 184. 
106 Medders, McCullough & Jäger, supra note 98, at 185. 
107  Suzanne Vallet, The French Experience in the Management and 
Compensation of Large scale Disasters, in CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND INS. 293, 300 
(2005). 
108 Medders, McCullough & Jäger, supra note 98, at 184. 
109  OECD, DISASTER RISK FINANCING IN APEC ECONOMIES 73 (2013), 
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residential policies which cover losses to personal dwellings and contents 
caused by earthquakes and volcanic eruptions and then cede these risks to 
JERS.110JERS is a specialized reinsurance company but backed by the 
Japanese government. It can also be seen as an earthquake reinsurance 
pool, retaining a portion of the liability and retroceding the rest to private 
insurers (based on their market share) and to the Japanese government 
through reinsurance treaties.111 To be clear, JERS only covers personal 
residential, not commercial, earthquake insurance. 
The professional reinsurance business operations are all managed 
by JERS, not the Japanese government. Nevertheless, the successful 
operation of JERS depends on a commitment from the Japanese 
government, which provides significant reinsurance capacity as a last 
resort. 112 It can be illustrated by the aggregate limit of indemnity for 
earthquake insurance liabilities (JPY 6.2 trillion), which is shared by the 
private insurers and the government among different layers. The first layer, 
which covers earthquake insurance liabilities up to JPY 85 billion, is totally 
compensated by JERS; the second layer, which covers earthquake 
insurance liabilities over JPY 85 billion and up to JPY 348.8 billion, is 
compensated by equal contributions by the Japanese government (50 
percent) and JERS and private insurers (due to retroceded risk from JERS; 
50 percent); and the third layer, which covers earthquake insurance 
liabilities from JPY 348.8 billion to JPY 6.2 trillion, is mostly compensated 
by the Japanese government (99.6 percent) and a very small share by 
private insurers (0.4 percent) (Figure 4).113 If the earthquake insurance 
liabilities of one peril exceed JPY 6.2 trillion, residential policyholders’ 
claims are reduced proportionately following the provisions of the Act on 
Earthquake Insurance.114 
 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/insurance/OECD_APEC_DisasterRiskFinancing.pdf.  
110 Yuichi Takeda, Government as Reinsurers of Last Resort: The Japanese 
Experience, in CATASTROPHE RISK AND REINSURANCE: A COUNTRY RISK 
MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 225-237 (Eugene N. Gurenko eds. 2004). 
111 Michael Faure & Jing Liu, The Tsunami of March 2011 and the Subsequent 
Nuclear Incident at Fukushima: Who Compensates the Victims, 37 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 129, 149 (2012). 
112 Takeda, supra note 110. 
113 Id.; OECD, supra note 109. 
114 See OECD, supra note 109, at 73. 
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Figure 4. Risk allocation under the Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance 
Scheme115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Loss-Sensitive Premiums. Making the premiums loss-sensitive is 
one of the most challenging tasks for a public-private partnership. This is 
no exception for JERS. The reinsurance price of JERS is not market-based 
but determined by the Japanese government. The premiums are not 
loss-sensitive, but set to follow a general fair-value principle.116  
The Duty of Utmost Good Faith. Primary insurers’ duty of utmost 
good faith is extremely important for JERS. The primary insurers could 
cede 100 percent of the underwritten earthquake insurance exposure to 
JERS.117 If primary insurers underwrite inappropriately, JERS will assume 
all the bad risks. According to the requirement of utmost good faith, the 
primary insurers should disclose all material facts which may affect the 
subject risk. In order to enforce such a requirement, the Japanese 
government stipulated that all rating work is set solely by the 
Non-Life-Insurance Rating Organization of Japan (NLIRO) and not by 
primary insurers.118 The NLIRO has to file materials setting, modifying 
and revising the base rates to the Financial Supervisory Authority for 
                                                                                                                 
115 Id. 
116 Currently the details of JER reinsurance contracts are not fully disclosed, 
except the names of the counterparties and the amount of reinsurance. It is difficult 
to supply the basic elements of the general fair-value principle. Some anecdotes 
from the Japanese insurance industry imply that affordability and sustainability are 
both important considerations of this principle. See Takeda, supra note 110, at 231. 
117  THE GENEVA ASSOCIATION, INSURERS’ CONTRIBUTIONS TO DISASTER 
REDUCTION—A SERIES OF CASE STUDIES 7, 48 (Meghan Orie & Walter R. Stahel 
eds., 2013). 
118 Takeda, supra note 110, at 230-231. 
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approval.119 Under this approach, JERS is able to access the underwriting 
materials of its ceding companies. Besides this arrangement, the duty of 
utmost good faith is also enforced by reinsurance treaty provisions. The 
Earthquake Reinsurance Treaty between JERS and private insurance 
companies includes the retrocession provision, which provides that primary 
insurers cede their underwritten risks to JERS, and JERS in turn retrocedes 
the risks in the second layer to the primary insurers and the Japanese 
government with equal portion.120 Retroceding 50 percent of the risk in the 
second layer to primary insurers contributes to their performance of the 
duty of utmost good faith. 
Providing Risk Management Service. One purpose of establishing 
JERS is to facilitate loss mitigation and a recovery process through the 
insurance industry. However, in practice, the NLIRO, rather than JERS, 
undertakes major service works for primary insurers. 
Indirect Regulation of Insureds. Since JERS is licensed to conduct 
business in Japan, there is no need for a fronting agreement. JERS has 
incentives to regulate insureds’ behavior and awareness of earthquake risks 
because primary insurers cede 100 percent of the risks to JERS. For 
example, JERS uses deductibles to enhance individuals’ risk mitigation 
efforts.121 
 
C. THE TURKISH TCIP  
 
Compared to CCR and JERS, the Turkish government does not 
establish a specific reinsurance company to assume catastrophe risk. The 
Turkish government provides contingent liquidity support when the 
payments of claims exceed TCIP’s capacity.122 It could be regarded as 
reinsurance since it is the last resort. The first layer reinsurance 
arrangement under the mechanisms of TCIP is the international reinsurers, 
which assume the transferred risks from TCIP. Therefore, the regulatory 
techniques of reinsurance include both international reinsurers and the 
Turkish government.  
                                                                                                                 
119 Id. at 234. 
120  K. KAWACHIMARU, NON-LIFE INSURANCE RATING ORGANIZATION OF 
JAPAN, Disaster Risk Management in Japan, in CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND 
INSURANCE 303, 318 (2005). 
121 If the premium exceeds $550 per policy, this amount is the deductible; 
otherwise the deductible is equal to the premium of the policy. See Youbaraj Paudel, 
A Comparative Study of Public-Private Catastrophe Insurance Systems: Lessons 
from Current Practices, 37 GENEVA PAPERS 257, 278 (2012). 
122 EUGENE GURENKO, EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE IN TURKEY: HISTORY OF THE 
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In 1999, Governmental Decree Law No. 587 on Compulsory 
Earthquake Insurance (“Decree Law”) came into force and gave birth to 
TCIP in the aftermath of the devastating Marmara earthquake.123 TCIP is a 
public-private partnership (Figure 5). Insurance companies act as agents to 
TCIP and cede 100 percent of all risks acquired by TCIP, and they receive 
a commission from the pool. 124  TCIP transfers risks to international 
reinsurers through sharing pools under the management of international 
reinsurance companies, like Munich Re.125 The claims payment of TCIP is 
dependent on international reinsurance and on the amount of funds 
collected (partially from the government). 126  The board of directors 
represents the government, experts, and insurance companies. The 
administrative body of TCIP is the General Directorate of Insurance within 
the Prime Ministry Under-Secretariat of the Treasury, but the business 
operation is managed by Milli Reasürans (“operational manager”), a 
national reinsurance company.127 
  
                                                                                                                 
123 Id. at 87-95. 
124 See Johann-Adrian von Lucius, A Reinsurer’s Perspective on the Turkish 
Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP), in CATASTROPHE RISK AND REINSURANCE: A 
COUNTRY RISK MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 217, 219 (Eugene N. Gurenko, eds. 
2004) (stating that the TCIP supplies earthquake insurance to homeowners, and 
covers losses caused by earthquakes and earthquake-related catastrophes, such as 
fires, explosions, landslides, and tsunamis); Burcak Başbuğ-Erkan & Ozlem 
Yilmaz, Successes and Failures of Compulsory Risk Mitigation: Re-evaluating the 
Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool, 39 DISASTERS 782, 789 (2015). 
125 Başbuğ-Erkan & Yilmaz, supra note 124, at 782. 
126 It would only be triggered by an event equivalent to an earthquake in 
Istanbul with a 200-year return period (technically, an earthquake with an 
exceedance probability of 0.5 percent). See GURENKO, supra note 122, at xi. 
127  Başbuğ-Erkan & Yilmaz, supra note 124. All of its business 
functions—from sales to reinsurance to claim management—are subcontracted to 
the private insurance industry, and the TCIP has no public employees. See 
GURENKO, supra note 122. 
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Figure 5. Organizational chart of the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance 
Pool128 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Loss-Sensitive Premiums. Since the business operation of TCIP 
follows a market-oriented approach, and its underwritten risks are 
transferred to international reinsurers, it is reasonable for international 
reinsurers to charge loss-sensitive premiums to control the moral hazard of 
TCIP. Loss-sensitive premiums require that reinsurance premiums should 
reflect an actuarially fair cost, and they constrain TCIP to underwrite 
appropriately. With the burden from the reinsurance, TCIP adopts a 
differential risk-based pricing approach and imposes construction 
maintenance obligations on the insured in the policies to mitigate 
underwritten losses.129 
The Duty of Utmost Good Faith. Primary insurers play a different 
role in TCIP compared to their role in the French CCR or the Japanese 
JERS. Primary insurers act as agents to TCIP, and the pool assumes all the 
earthquake risks.130 The duty of utmost good faith is not suitable for 
primary insurers. In contrast, TCIP transfers risk to international reinsurers. 
                                                                                                                 
128 Başbuğ-Erkan & Yilmaz, supra note 124. 
129  Article 14 of Governmental Decree Law No. 587 on Compulsory 
Earthquake Insurance (“The owner who causes or allows the building and each 
independent section thereof to be altered contrary to the related design and in a 
way that will affect the load-bearing system, loses his entitlement to compensation 
in as much as the actual loss arises or increases because of such reason.”). 
130 von Lucius, supra note 124. 
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From the perspective of international reinsurers, it requires TCIP to 
perform the duty of utmost good faith. The organizational structure of 
TCIP, to some extent, might guarantee its performance through 
public-private partnership.  
Providing Risk Management Service. Reinsurers play an important 
role as consultants, especially in the conception of TCIP. As a matter of 
fact, TCIP was formed with the cooperation of the World Bank, the 
Turkish Government, Milli Re, reinsurance brokers, and Munich Re.131 
International reinsurers play an important role in providing risk 
management services and contribute to the operation of TCIP and 
catastrophe risk management in Turkey. 
Indirect Regulation of Insureds. Since international reinsurers, such 
as Munich Re, are licensed to conduct business in Turkey, there is no need 
for a fronting agreement arrangement. There is no empirical evidence that 
TCIP indirectly regulates insureds. 
 
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
Controlling moral hazard and providing incentives to loss control 
benefit both reinsurers and primary insurers. Such efforts will encourage 
ceding companies to regulate behaviors of policyholders, decrease cost for 
ceding companies, and enhance profits for reinsurers. It is a win-win 
strategy for both reinsurers and primary insurers. Compared to private 
reinsurers, government-sponsored reinsurance meets more challenges to 
fulfill regulatory techniques due to political pressures and other constraints. 
Table 1 summarizes the regulation by government-sponsored reinsurance 
among the three countries in the preceding discussion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
131 WORLD FORUM OF CATASTROPHE PROGRAMMES, NATURAL CATASTROPHES 
INSURANCE COVER: A DIVERSITY OF SYSTEMS 163-164 (2008). 
http://www.wfcatprogrammes.com/c/document_library/get_file?folderId=13442&n
ame=DLFE-553.pdf. 
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Table 1. Comparison of regulation by government-sponsored reinsurance 
 
 French CCR Japanese 
JERS 
Turkish TCIP 
Loss-sensitive 
premiums 
Partially No  Yes 
The duty of 
utmost good 
faith 
Yes  Yes  Probably 
Providing risk 
management 
services 
Not clear Not clear  Yes 
Indirect 
regulation of 
insureds 
No Yes No 
 
This table shows that no government-sponsored reinsurance fully 
performs regulatory techniques. It seems that the Turkish TCIP is subject to 
less moral hazard than the French CCR and the Japanese JERS. TCIP cedes 
risks to international reinsurers following a loss-sensitive premiums 
approach and thus has more incentives to underwrite appropriately, such as 
identifying “bad risks,” enforcing building codes, and educating the public 
to raise their awareness to catastrophe risk. Meanwhile, international 
reinsurers not only helped found TCIP, but also worked as consultants to 
supply risk management services. The application of regulatory techniques 
of reinsurance helps TCIP work sustainably. For example, TCIP supplies a 
model solution, especially for developing and middle-income countries 
where rigorous catastrophe risks exist. 
Different from TCIP, the French CCR and the Japanese JERS are 
both government-sponsored reinsurance institutions and not involved with 
other private reinsurance companies. Although they do not adopt 
loss-based premiums due to political pressures, they are better in enforcing 
primary insurers’ duty of utmost good faith than TCIP. CCR’s system is 
particularly suitable to France for several reasons. The first reason is 
cultural influence. In France, people value the national solidarity principle 
and are tolerant of cross-subsidies between different classes of risk and 
different regions, both of which guarantee a single-rate price for 
reinsurance. The second reason is social adequacy and affluence. As a 
developed and high-income country, the French government has more 
capacity to sponsor policyholders. The third reason is the moderate 
exposure to disasters. None of the twenty-five worst natural disasters 
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recorded, including earthquakes, typhoons, and tsunamis, occurred in 
France.132 In addition, during the last several decades (1970–2013), none 
of the natural disasters which caused the top ten insured catastrophe losses 
occurred in France.133 
Japan faces more severe catastrophe risks than France because of 
the frequent occurrence of earthquakes and tsunamis. The establishment of 
the Japanese JERS is the compromise between the government and the 
insurance industry: the government provides reinsurance capacity as a last 
resort and facilitates insurance affordability.134 There is no doubt that 
JERS refuses loss-sensitive premiums but follows a general fair-value 
principle for price setting. Under such a situation, JERS pays more 
attention to monitoring primary insurers’ performance of duty of utmost 
good faith and indirect regulation of insureds to control moral hazard and 
mitigate losses.  
 
VI. EXPANDING REGULATION BY 
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED CATASTROPHE 
REINSURANCE TO CHINA 
 
This Article has reviewed the imperfections of private reinsurance, 
mainly due to the apparent shortage of reinsurance capital, especially 
during hard markets. Also discussed were government- sponsored 
reinsurance programs in France, Japan, and Turkey, which represent both 
high-income and middle-income countries. The focus now is to explore the 
possibility of expanding regulation by reinsurance to China.  
 
A. THE ISSUE OF THE GOVERNMENT’S PROVIDING REINSURANCE 
CAPACITY IN CHINA 
 
Section IV has explained the imperfections of the private 
reinsurance market for catastrophe risks, but these market failures are not 
sufficient to justify any and all government intervention: there are many 
different forms of government-provided reinsurance, some of which may 
be ineffective (no efficiency gains achieved) or even detrimental (causing 
efficiency losses).135 One popular approach to government intervention is 
                                                                                                                 
132 Josef, 25 Worst Natural Disasters Ever Recorded, LIST 25 (Aug. 26, 2013), 
http://list25.com/25-worst-natural-disasters-recorded/5/.  
133Natural Catastrophes and Man-Made Disasters in 2013: Large Losses from 
Floods and Hail; Haiyan Hits the Philippines, SWISS RE 5 (2014), 
http://institute.swissre.com/research/overview/sigma/1_2014.html. 
134 Takeda, supra note 110. 
135 David Cummins & Olivier Mahul, Catastrophe Risk Financing in Developing 
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to provide a government bailout to victims, including ad hoc direct 
payment and establishing compensation funds. This type of ex-post bailout 
is known as the Whole-Nation System and generally seen as problematic.136 
Another popular approach to government intervention is 
government-provided insurance. Compared with ex-post government 
bailouts, this type of government intervention looks more attractive, since 
an ex-ante insurance approach could accumulate reserves and may provide 
incentives to mitigate losses before disasters if associated with risk-based 
premiums. However, this type of government intervention is also generally 
seen as problematic. 137  Even for China, where private catastrophe 
insurance has not yet developed, the government should facilitate private 
insurance rather than provide government insurance. The Chinese 
government could adopt a reinsurance regime for catastrophes or provide 
reinsurance capacity as a last resort. Such arrangements and intervention 
provide considerable incentive for primary insurers to control moral hazard 
and mitigate losses associated with catastrophic disasters. 
Right now, China has begun to stimulate the development of 
catastrophe insurance to complement government action in addressing 
catastrophe risks. The government’s provision of reinsurance capacity 
would also be a response to the concern and demand of private insurers and 
reinsurers.  
The current insurance industry has few incentives to underwrite 
catastrophe risks partly due to scarce insurance and reinsurance capacity. In 
2013, the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Communist Party of 
China Central Committee promulgated the “Decision of the Central 
                                                                                                                 
Countries: Principles for Public Intervention, THE WORLD BANK 76 (2009), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/CATRISKbook.p
df; see also W. Neil Adger, Nigel Arnell, & Emma Tompkins, Successful adaptation to 
climate change across scales, 15(2) Global Environmental Change 85 (2005).  
136 Simply speaking, the problems include undercutting potential victims’ 
incentives for risk prevention and loss mitigation; posing a heavy fiscal burden for 
the government and may cause negative distributional effects; leading to political 
inefficiencies and etc.  
137 For example, government-provided insurance always delivers a subsidy 
that private insurance does not give and inflicts two distortions: (1) regressive 
redistribution favoring affluent policyholders; and (2) inefficient investment in 
residential property by locating too many assets in vulnerable areas. Some scholars 
have reviewed and examined two government-provided insurance programs: (1) 
the National Flood Insurance Program; and (2) Florida’s state owned Citizens 
Insurance, and found that both perceptions of government-provided insurance 
performance along two normative metrics: fairness and efficiency, are wrong. See 
Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather 
Insurance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2016). 
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Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues 
concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform,” which expressly 
stated that “we will establish an insurance system for catastrophe risks.” In 
2014, catastrophe insurance program trials were launched in Shenzhen, in 
the Pearl River Delta (a densely populated metropolitan area and also one 
of the world’s most disaster-prone regions), and in the Chuxiong region in 
the southwestern province of Yunnan, known to be prone to earthquakes.138 
However, private catastrophe insurance is one of the least developed lines 
in China. For example, after the 2008 Great Sichuan Earthquake, only 0.3 
percent of the total losses were covered by insurance companies.139 Private 
insurers do not have the capital to fully cover catastrophe losses. The total 
capital of China’s property insurance companies is much lower than the 
total amount of losses caused by natural disasters. Table 2 shows the 
existence of this big gap. Moreover, the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission has implemented China’s Risk-Orientated Solvency System as 
of 2015.140 The new solvency regime requires insurers, like the Solvency II 
Directive in the European Union, to hold sufficient capital in their reserves, 
especially the capital for catastrophe risks that they are facing.141 In order 
to underwrite catastrophe risks, insurers have an increasing demand for 
more financial capacity and share a significant portion of the insured losses 
with reinsurers.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
138 China says testing catastrophe insurance system, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2014), 
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20140820/NEWS04/140829990?AllowView
=VDl3UXk1T3hDUFNCbkJiYkY1TDJaRUt0ajBRV0ErOVVHUT09#.  
139 Establishing catastrophe insurance system faces acceleration, CHINA YOUTH 
DAILY (March 14, 2011), http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2011-03/14/nw.D110000zgqnb_ 
20110314_1-05.htm?div=-1.  
140 Wenhui Chen, C-ROSS under the Market-oriented Reform and Economy 
Globalization, SWISS RE (2014), http://media.swissre.com/documents/CROSS_under_ 
the_market_ChenWenhui_Dec15.pdf.  
141 Id. 
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Table 2. Capital of main Chinese property insurers compared to natural 
disaster losses (billions of US $) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Net capital of 
main insurers  
5.5 5.1 6.9 9.0 
Natural disaster 
losses  
38.1 189.5 40.1 86.1 
(Source: Yearbook of China Insurance [2008–2011]) 
 
Reinsurance is an important potential complement to expanding 
primary insurers’ capacity to underwrite risks. However, reinsurance 
currently does not provide strong support for catastrophe insurance in 
China. At present, the China Reinsurance (Group) Corporation (its 
predecessor, the People’s Insurance Company of China Reinsurance, was 
created in 1996) is the only domestic reinsurer in China, with consolidated 
total assets of around $30 billion and net assets of $8.6 billion.142 Its 
capital is much lower than the annual losses caused by natural disasters. 
Although China’s reinsurance market has become open to foreign 
reinsurance companies after China's entry into the World Trade 
Organization, only a few reinsurance companies, such as Swiss Re and 
Munich Re, have established business operations in China, and they are 
only in the initial stages of reinsuring risks. By 2013, there were only eight 
foreign reinsurers who had registered branches in China. 143  When 
underwriting catastrophe risks, domestic reinsurers will strongly demand 
government sponsorship, which could provide the government with deep 
credit capacity.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
142  China Re, Annual Report 2014 (2014) http://www.chinare.com.cn/ 
zhzjt/resource/cms/2015/08/2015082709085075513.pdf.   
143  CPCR, Overview of Chinese Reinsurance Market (May 20, 2013), 
https://www.casact.org/education/spring/2013/handouts%5CPaper_1680_handout_
962_0.pdf.   
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B. EFFECTIVENESS OF REGULATION BY CATASTROPHE 
REINSURANCE 
 
There is little doubt that the government should provide 
reinsurance capacity as a last resort to catastrophe risk management in 
China. What is less clear is how to apply the proper regulatory techniques, 
as discussed in sections III and V. Clearly, catastrophe reinsurance is 
closely associated with the operation of primary insurance. As mentioned 
above, in 2014, China launched its first catastrophe insurance pilot in 
Shenzhen (Shenzhen Model). Therefore, the possibility and feasibility of 
regulation by reinsurance in China will be explored through the 
examination of its regulatory techniques in the Shenzhen Model. 
Shenzhen was selected for the pilot because it has both major 
exposure to catastrophe threats144 and a large number of valuable assets.145 
The catastrophe insurance framework of the Shenzhen Model includes 
three different layers: the first layer is the government catastrophe 
insurance assistance, which is bought by the Shenzhen municipal 
government, with the beneficiaries being all residents of Shenzhen City; the 
second layer is a catastrophe fund mainly sponsored by the Shenzhen 
government and social donations; and the third layer is commercial 
catastrophe insurance.146 The first two layers of the Shenzhen Model 
represent the social insurance protection. According to the arrangement in 
the first layer, the Shenzhen city government buys catastrophe insurance 
products from the People's Insurance Company of China (PICC), Shenzhen 
branch.147 It has a cap of RMB 2.5 billion with individual claim payments 
                                                                                                                 
144 Frequently occurring disasters in Shenzhen include, but are not limited to, 
heavy winds (extending to whole gale, strong gale, and fresh gale), rainstorms, 
lightning strikes, floods, waterlogging, tornados, typhoons, tsunamis, hail, landslides, 
mudslides, cliff fall, land subsidence, squall lines, and earthquakes of more than 4.5 
magnitude. See ICC, Catastrophe Insurance Framework of Shenzhen City (2015), 
http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=oLT1RmQ3BXgfW49ETc-Drhv6S1pOb8dOA5E3Y
OVZgCAkJrTD-aiBaF1doiXOq9Xsb1rLoty4IP-b1dPBKzZY2eiNgZex52GfzpdheyzE
It.  
145 Shenzhen is a megacity with approximately 15 million residents. It is 
China’s first and one of the most successful Special Economic Zones with its GDP 
totaled $260.48 billion in 2014. See Yisha Hou, Promoting the Construction of 
Shenzhen Catastrophe Insurance System, 25 DISASTER REDUCTION IN CHINA 42, 
42-45 (2015). 
146 China says testing catastrophe insurance system, supra note 138. 
147 The individuals receiving coverage under the Shenzhen model do not pay 
upfront for any losses through deductibles. See Anastasia Telesetsky, Climate 
Change Insurance and Disasters: Is the Shenzhen Parametric Social Insurance a 
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of RMB 100,000, and the payments are only available for bodily injury and 
death, but not for property damage.148 According to the arrangement in the 
second layer, the Shenzhen city government has committed to providing 
RMB 36 million of funds annually to support the first layer. The third layer 
is related to private insurance and policies that could cover property 
damages. In the conception of the Shenzhen Model, reinsurers like the 
China Re, Swiss Re, and Taiping Re were involved. Therefore, reinsurance 
could and should play its role to control moral hazard of primary insurers 
and mitigate losses through relevant regulatory techniques.  
Loss-Sensitive Premiums. In the first layer of the Shenzhen Model, 
the government buys insurance products from insurance companies (e.g., 
PICC, Shenzhen branch) rather than acting as a reinsurer. PICC cedes a 
large portion of underwriting to Swiss Re, China Re, and Taiping Re, 
according to the quota share treaties. 149  These treaties provide 
loss-sensitive premiums for PICC. Following loss-sensitive premiums, 
primary insurers have incentives to control moral hazard and mitigate 
losses. PICC has worked in tandem with experts, insureds, and other 
stakeholders to identify the technical and economic parameters of 
catastrophe risks and develop system-wide technologies of loss prevention. 
For example, PICC extracts 5 percent of the premium to organize disaster 
research, disaster prevention, disaster emergency relief drills, and disaster 
emergency advertising; submits to the government a quarterly report of 
current disaster and claims payments and an annual report of disaster risk 
management; offers advice on risk prevention, emergency management, 
and disaster relief to the municipal government; and establishes and 
operates a disaster data base for disaster analysis and prevention. 150 
Furthermore, loss-sensitive premiums also induce primary insurers to 
regulate policyholder’s behavior for loss mitigation. PICC offers the 
Shenzhen government a discounted premium for taking cost-effective 
mitigation measures. For example, PICC provides that if the annual loss 
ratio (actual payment amount / total premium) is less than 10 percent, then 
the premium the following year will be discounted by 10 percent; if the loss 
                                                                                                                 
Model for Adaptation?, 43(2) B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 485 (May 31, 2016).  
148 Martin Li & Yin Ran, SZ launches 1st disaster insurance, SHENZHEN DAILY 
(July 17, 2014), http://szdaily.sznews.com/html/2014-07/10/content_2936724.htm.  
149 China Re, Swiss Re, and Taiping Re Underwrite the Shenzhen Catastrophe 
Reinsurance Policies, 21ST CENTURY BUS. HERALD (July 6, 2014), 
http://xw.sinoins.com/2014-07/16/content_121575.htm. 
150  PICC, Catastrophe Insurance Framework of Shenzhen City (2015), 
http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=oLT1RmQ3BXgfW49ETc-Drhv6S1pOb8dOA5E
3YOVZgCAkJrTD-aiBaF1doiXOq9Xsb1rLoty4IP-b1dPBKzZY2eiNgZex52Gfzp
dheyzEIt3. 
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ratio is less than 10 percent in two consecutive years, the third year’s 
premium will be discounted by 20 percent; if the loss ratio is less than 10 
percent in three consecutive years, the fourth year’s premium will be 
discounted by 30 percent.151  
In the third layer of the Shenzhen Model, the PingAn Insurance 
Company starts to design and sell relative catastrophe insurance products to 
the residents of Shenzhen.152 There is no doubt that commercial primary 
insurers, like PingAn Insurance Company, also have strong incentives to 
transfer catastrophe risks to reinsurers. The form of government 
sponsorship has not yet been decided in the Shenzhen Model. From the 
perspective of control of moral hazard, the approach of TCIP might be a 
good choice: the government only provides contingent liquidity support 
when the payments of claims exceed insurers’ capacity. If China follows 
the model of CCR or JERS, political pressure or other reasons would not 
prevent it from repeating their mistakes in subsidizing premiums.  
The Duty of Utmost Good Faith. According to the quota share 
treaty between insurers and reinsurers, it could contribute to PICC’s 
performance of the duty of utmost good faith, since PICC has to retain 
some portion of the risks itself. In contrast, the typical long-term 
relationship mechanism between insurers and reinsurers, which is closely 
associated with utmost good faith may not be workable in the Shenzhen 
Model. The current Shenzhen Model is a temporary trial project and lacks 
legislative provisions. 153  Without explicit legislative provisions, the 
prospect of the Shenzhen Model is quite uncertain. The Shenzhen 
municipal government may cease to buy catastrophe insurance policies in 
future years. If the government does not buy insurance, there is no 
opportunity for a long-term relationship between PICC and reinsurers. 
Providing Risk Management Services. Like TCIP, reinsurers, 
especially international reinsurers like Swiss Re and Munich Re, play an 
important role as consultants to provide risk management services in the 
conception of the Shenzhen Model. For example, Swiss Re initiated a 
Parametric Insurance Solutions for Disaster Relief System Reform research 
program in 2013 as a sponsor for the China Development and Research 
Foundation.154 This research program helps Swiss Re become a technical 
advisor and a leading reinsurer for the Shenzhen Model.155 
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152 Yisha Hou, supra note 145. 
153 Shi Xing, Inspirations of Shenzhen catastrophe insurance pilot revelation, 
21ST CENTURY BUS. HERALD (Oct. 11, 2014), http://insurance.hexun.com/ 
2014-10-11/169210867.html. 
154Swiss Re Works with Government Bodies in Mitigating Natural Catastrophe 
Risks in China, SWISS RE (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.swissre.com/ 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Government-sponsored reinsurance can not only support failing 
catastrophe insurance due to the deep credit capacity of the government. 
Considered the corollary of the regulation-by-insurance idea,156 as the title 
of this Article suggests, government-sponsored reinsurance can also 
regulate primary insurers’ behaviors in risk mitigation and risk 
management through reinsurers’ regulatory techniques.  
Currently, affected parties of natural disasters, especially the pilot 
catastrophe insurers, are demanding government sponsorship of their 
catastrophe losses in China. Considering the reform of the Whole-Nation 
System, there is a pressing need for the Chinese government to provide 
reinsurance capacity as the new government-intervention approach. 
Moreover, regardless of which type of government intervention the 
Chinese government adopts, it is necessary to exert the role of reinsurance 
in regulating primary insurers through reinsurance regulatory techniques.  
                                                                                                                 
china/Swiss_Re_works_with_government_bodies_in_mitigating_natural_catastrop
he_risks_in_China.html.  
155 Liu Ailin, Risks of the First Catastrophe Insurance Policy Are Ceded to 
China Re, Swiss Re and CPIC Re, 21ST CENTURY BUS. HERALD (July 16, 2014), 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/insurance/bxdt/20140716/025719714880.shtml. 
156 Abramovsky, supra note 4 (“Just as insurance is often viewed as having a 
regulatory effect on insured industries, so too should reinsurance be considered as 
having a regulatory effect on its reinsureds.”). 
